Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
The G-20 is an international forum for discussing and coordinating economic
policies among major advanced and emerging economies. Congress may want to
exercise oversight over the Administration’s participation in the G-20
process, including the policy commitments that the Administration is
making in the G-20 and the policies it is encouraging other G-20 countries to pursue.
Background
The G-20 rose to prominence during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009,
when it played an arguably influential role in coordinating international
responses to the crisis. Leaders agreed that the G-20 would be the “premier”
forum for international economic coordination, a position previously held
by a smaller group of advanced economies (the Group of 7, or G-7, which includes
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States).
G-20 leaders have annual meetings (“summits”), and meetings among lower-level
officials from the G-20 countries occur more frequently. Meetings
primarily focus on international economic and financial issues, although
related topics are also discussed, including development, food security,
and the environment, among others. Previous summits have, for example, focused
on financial regulatory reform, global imbalances, funding for the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), voting power of emerging economies in
international financial institutions, and fossil fuel subsidies.
The G-20 in 2013 and 2014
The G-20 has a rotating presidency, which is held by Russia in 2013. The
Russian government indicated that it wanted to use its presidency to focus
on macroeconomic and financial sector issues. The Russian government
hosted the 2013 G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 5-6,
2013, which focused on a wide range of economic issues, including trade, investment,
jobs, financial regulation, and corruption. Foreign policy issues, most notably
the situation in Syria, were also discussed. Australia is scheduled to
assume the G-20 presidency in 2014 and host the next summit in Brisbane on
November 15-16, 2014. In addition to the summits, several meetings among
lower level officials, including finance ministers and central bank governors
among others, are scheduled throughout the year.
Effectiveness of the G-20
Some analysts say that while the G-20 was instrumental in coordinating the
response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, its effectiveness
has diminished as the urgency of the crisis has waned. They argue that the
G-20 has failed to provide adequate international leadership in key policy
areas, including responses to the Eurozone crisis and forging a conclusion to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. They also maintain that the G-20 as a group is too heterogeneous
to achieve real coordination and its agenda is too ambitious. Others argue
that the G-20 serves as an important institution in the international economy.
They argue that the G-20 is a critical forum for discussing major policy
initiatives across major countries and encouraging greater cooperation,
even if agreement on policies is not always reached. They also argue that
it serves as a useful institution as a steering committee for other
international organizations, such as the IMF, and that having the G-20
policy-making infrastructure in place is important for timely
international responses to future crises.
Date of Report: October 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R40977
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Rebecca M. Nelson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
This report shows in tabular form how much the Administration requested and
how much Congress appropriated for U.S. payments to the multilateral
development banks (MDBs) since 2000. It also provides a brief description
of the MDBs and the ways they fund their operations. It will be updated
periodically as annual appropriation figures are known. The title of this
report will also change annually, as new yearly appropriation figures are
added.
For FY2014, the Administration has requested funds for several of the
non-concessional lending facilities at the MDBs. Several of the MDBs are
in the process of increasing the size of their nonconcessional lending
facilities, a process frequently called a “general capital increase” (GCI).
GCIs are relatively unusual, particularly for so many institutions at the same
time. Contributions to the GCIs are expected to be spread out over a five-
to eight-year period, depending on the institution. For most of the
institutions, the funds appropriated in FY2012 were the first annual payment.
In addition to funds for the GCIs, the Administration has requested for FY2014
funds for several MDB concessional lending facilities and more targeted
MDB funds, such as those dedicated to environmental issues.
For further information about the MDBs, the GCIs, and relevant U.S. policy
process, see:
Date of Report: October 21, 2013
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: RS20792
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Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
U.S.-China economic ties have expanded
substantially over the past three decades. Total U.S.- China trade rose
from $5 billion in 1981 to $536 billion in 2012. China is currently the United States’
second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its
biggest source of imports. According to one estimate, China is currently a
$250 billion market for U.S. firms (i.e., U.S. exports to China plus sales
by U.S.-invested firms in China). Many U.S. firms view participation in
China’s market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors
(GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in
China than in the United States from 2010 to 2012. In addition, U.S. imports of
low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers, and U.S. firms
that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use
Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower
costs. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities
($1.3 trillion as of May 2013). China’s purchases of U.S. government debt
help keep U.S. interest rates low.
Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become
increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S.
perspective, many trade tensions stem from China’s incomplete transition
to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized it’s
economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to
maintain, (or has recently imposed) a number state-directed policies that
appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern
expressed by U.S. policymakers and stakeholders include China’s relatively poor
record of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement and alleged
widespread cyber espionage against U.S. firms by Chinese government entities;
its mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO)
obligations; its extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial
support of state-owned firms, trade and investment barriers, and pressure
on foreign-invested firms in China to transfer technology in exchange for
market access) in order to promote the development of industries favored
by the government and protect them from foreign competition); and its
policies to maintain an undervalued currency. Many U.S. policymakers argue
that such policies are harm U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S
job losses. For example, one U.S. government study estimated that IPR
infringement in China cost U.S. firms $48 billion in 2009.
Some Members of Congress advocate a more assertive U.S. trade policy towards
China, such as increasing the number of dispute settlement cases brought
against China in the WTO, where the United States has prevailed on a
number of issues. During his State of the Union Address in January 2012,
President Obama announced plans to create a new Trade Enforcement Unit “charged
with investigating unfair trade practices in countries like China.” Some
analysts caution that taking a more aggressive stance against China over
its trade policies could induce it to retaliate against U.S. exports to,
and investment in, China. They further contend that major economic disputes
should be dealt with through established high-level bilateral dialogues, such
as the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the U.S.-China
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT). Many trade observers
contend that the United States should also continue to press China to
rebalance its economic growth model by boosting domestic consumption and decreasing
the country’s reliance on exports and fixed investment for its economic growth,
which could significantly boost Chinese imports. This report provides an
overview of U.S.-China commercial ties and discusses major trade disputes
issues and will be updated as events warrant.
Date of Report: September 30, 2013
Number of Pages: 56
Order Number: RL33536
Price: $29.95
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