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Thursday, February 3, 2011

Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2011

Jonathan E. Sanford
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

This report shows in tabular form how much the Administration requested and how much Congress appropriated during the past 11 years for U.S. payments to the multilateral development banks (MDBs). It also provides a brief description of the MDBs and the ways they fund their operations. It will be updated periodically as annual appropriation figures are known. The title of this report will also change annually, as new yearly appropriation figures are added.

As shown in the source note for Table 2 on page 6, the final appropriation figures for fiscal 2011 have not yet been determined. The Treasury Department made one payment to the African Development Fund (AfDF), however, because the organization was facing serious financial constraints and the Department had authority, under the then-current continuing resolution, to make that payment. For further information about the MDBs and the relevant U.S. policy process, see CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson; CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and Implements Policy, by Jonathan E. Sanford; and CRS Report R40977, The G-20 and International Economic Cooperation: Background and Implications for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson.



Date of Report: January 24, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS20792
Price: $29.95

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EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude


William H. Cooper
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

The United States and the European Union (EU) economic relationship is the largest in the world—and it is growing. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved since World War II, broadening as the six-member European Community expanded into the present 27- member European Union. The ties have also become more complex and interdependent, covering a growing number and type of trade and financial activities.

In 2009, $1,252.0 billion flowed between the United States and the EU on the current account, the most comprehensive measure of U.S. trade flows. The EU as a unit is the largest merchandise trading partner of the United States. In 2009, the EU accounted for $220.6 billion of total U.S. exports (or 20.8%) and for $281.8 billion of total U.S. imports (or 18.1%) for a U.S. trade deficit of $73.2 billion. The EU is also the largest U.S. trade partner when trade in services is added to trade in merchandise, accounting for $173.5 billion (or 34.5% of the total in U.S. services exports) and $134.8 billion (or 36.4% of total U.S. services imports) in 2009. In addition, in 2009, a net $114.1 billion flowed from U.S. residents to EU countries into direct investments, while a net $82.7 billion flowed from EU residents to direct investments in the United States.

Policy disputes arise between the United States and the EU generating tensions which sometimes lead to bilateral trade disputes. Yet, in spite of these disputes, the U.S.-EU economic relationship remains dynamic. It is a relationship that is likely to grow in importance assuming the trends toward globalization and the enlargement of the EU continue, forcing more trade and investment barriers to fall. Economists indicate that an expanded relationship would bring economic benefits to both sides in the form of wider choices of goods and services and greater investment opportunities.

But increasing economic interdependence brings challenges as well as benefits. As the U.S. and EU economies continue to integrate, some sectors or firms will “lose out” to increased competition and will resist the forces of change. Greater economic integration also challenges long-held notions of “sovereignty,” as national or regional policies have extraterritorial impact. Similarly, accepted understanding of “competition,” “markets,” and other economic concepts are tested as national borders dissolve with closer integration of economies.

U.S. and EU policymakers are likely to face the task of how to manage the increasingly complex bilateral economic relationship in ways that maximize benefits and keep frictions to a minimum, including developing new frameworks. For members during the 112
th Congress, it could mean weighing the benefits of greater economic integration against the costs to constituents in the context of overall U.S. national interests.


Date of Report: January 27, 2011
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: RL30608
Price: $29.95

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Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than as Treaties

Jeanne J. Grimmett
Legislative Attorney

U.S. trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization agreements, and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been approved by majority vote of each house rather than by two-thirds vote of the Senate—that is, they have been treated as congressional-executive agreements rather than as treaties. The congressional-executive agreement has been the vehicle for implementing Congress’s long-standing policy of seeking trade benefits for the United States through reciprocal trade negotiations. In a succession of statutes, Congress has authorized the President to negotiate and enter into tariff and nontariff barrier (NTB) agreements for limited periods, while permitting NTB and free trade agreements negotiated under this authority to enter into force for the United States only if they are approved by both houses in a bill enacted into public law and other statutory conditions are met; implementing bills are also accorded expedited consideration under the scheme.

The President was most recently granted temporary trade negotiating authority utilizing this approach in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (BTPAA), contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210. Although the authority expired during the 110
th Congress, agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, remain eligible for congressional consideration under the expedited procedure. Implementing bills for eight FTAs were signed into law under the 2002 act; agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea remain pending.

Implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia agreement was introduced in April 2008 (H.R. 5724, 110
th Congress), but House leadership considered that President Bush had submitted the bill without sufficient coordination with Congress, and the House subsequently voted to make key procedural rules for expedited consideration inapplicable to the legislation (H.Res. 1092, 110th Congress). In June 2010, President Obama announced that, after certain outstanding issues involving the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA were resolved, he intended to present Congress with an implementing bill for the agreement “in the few months” following the G-20 meeting to be held in Seoul in November 2010. The United States and Korea reached agreement on these issues on December 3, 2010. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) reportedly stated on January 13, 2011, that the Administration is aiming for a congressional vote on the KORUS FTA before July 1, 2011.

In addition, the USTR, on behalf of the President, notified the House and Senate in December 2009 by letter that the President intended to enter into negotiations aimed at a regional, Asia- Pacific trade agreement, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Although the trade agreement authorities of the BTPAA have expired, the USTR has stated the Administration was observing the relevant procedures of the act with respect to notifying and consulting with Congress regarding these negotiations.

A federal appeals court held in 2001 that the issue of whether the NAFTA should have been approved as a treaty was a nonjusticiable political question (Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11
th Cir. 2001)). The U.S. Supreme Court denied review in the case.


Date of Report: January 19, 2011
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: 97-896
Price: $29.95

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Wednesday, February 2, 2011

International Trade: Rules of Origin

Vivian C. Jones
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Michael F. Martin
Analyst in Asian Trade and Finance


Determining the country of origin of a product is important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade remedies (such as antidumping and countervailing duties) or quantitative restrictions (tariff quotas), and statistical purposes. Other commercial trade policies are also linked with origin determinations, such as country of origin labeling and government procurement regulations.

Rules of origin (ROO) can be very simple, noncontroversial tools of international trade as long as all of the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled primarily in one country. However, when a finished product’s component parts originate in many countries—as is often the case in today’s global trading environment—determining origin can be a very complex, sometimes subjective, and time-consuming process.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for determining country of origin using various ROO schemes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Preferential rules are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from certain U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing country beneficiaries to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under bilateral or regional FTAs and trade preference programs. Preferential rules of origin are generally specific to each FTA, or preference, meaning that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference.

CBP has periodically proposed implementing a more uniform system of ROO as an alternative to the “substantial transformation” rule that is currently in place. On July 25, 2008, CBP’s latest proposal suggested that a system known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules system “has proven to be more objective and transparent and provide greater predictability in determining the country of origin of imported merchandise than the system of case-by-case adjudication they would replace.” The NAFTA scheme that would be applied has already been used for several years to determine the origin of imports under the NAFTA, and for most textile and apparel imports (about 40% of U.S. imports). The CBP proposed to apply the NAFTA rules to all country of origin determinations made by CBP, unless otherwise specified (e.g., unless the import enters under a preferential ROO scheme already in place). The proposed rule changes received so many responses from the public that the deadline for public comment was extended twice, until December 1, 2008. Such changes in rules of origin requirements are often opposed by some importers due to costs involved in transitioning to new rules, or because they believe that certain products they import might be at a disadvantage under new ROO methodology. As of this writing, the proposal has not been implemented.

This report deals with ROO in three parts. First, we describe in more detail the reasons that country of origin rules are important and briefly describe U.S. laws and methods that provide direction in making these determinations. Second, we discuss briefly some of the more controversial issues involving rules of origin, including the apparently subjective nature of some CBP origin determinations, and the effects of the global manufacturing process on ROO. Third, we conclude with some alternatives and options that Congress could consider that might assist in simplifying the process.



Date of Report: January 11, 2011
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: RL34524
Price: $29.95

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Tuesday, February 1, 2011

The World Trade Organization: The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Negotiations


Ian F. Fergusson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round has emerged as a major stumbling block in the seven-year Doha Round negotiations. NAMA refers to the cutting of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) on industrial and primary products, basically all trade in goods which are not foodstuffs. While the agriculture negotiations have often overshadowed the NAMA talks, trade of industrial and primary products continues to make up the bulk of world trade. Average tariffs in developed countries have declined from 40% at the end of World War II to 6% today through successive rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO trade negotiations. Developed countries seek the reduction of continuing high tariffs in the developing world, particularly from such countries as Brazil, India, and China. Developing countries seek special and differential treatment and tie their cuts in industrial tariffs to reductions in agricultural tariffs and subsidies.

Several econometric studies have modeled the possible effect of industrial tariff liberalization on the global economy. The studies vary based on the assumptions and data used. All but one found a greater net welfare benefit from liberalization of manufacturing tariffs than from agriculture. The studies indicate that developing countries in the aggregate would gain the most from manufacturing liberalization, at least in relative terms, and that the single largest gainer in terms of net welfare benefit would be China.

In response to the global economic crisis, the Group of 20 (G-20) leading economies have repeatedly called for conclusion of the Doha Round as a way to bolster economic confidence and recovery. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has referred to 2011 as a window of opportunity to conclude the round and announced an intensive work program to achieve this goal. The subject of the current NAMA negotiation is a draft text—revised several times since its initial release in 2007—that has been subject to much disagreement.

The negotiation of the tariff reduction formula was initially the main stumbling block in the negotiations. Members agreed to a Swiss-formula non-linear tariff reduction formula approach at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, one in which higher tariffs are decreased more than lower tariffs. However, disagreements persist about the size or amounts of the tariff cuts. The talks also seek to reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers, which include import licensing; quotas and other quantitative import restrictions; conformity assessment procedures; and technical barriers to trade. The use of sectoral tariff elimination and special and differential treatment for developing countries has also proven controversial.

Legislation to implement any agreement that results from the Doha Round negotiations would need to be passed by Congress. U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), under which Congress agreed to a time line for voting on implementing legislation with no amendments in return for consultation and adherence to congressional negotiating objectives, expired on July 1, 2007. Consequently, there may be attempts to revise or extend TPA in order to consider legislation resulting from a Doha agreement.



Date of Report: January 11, 2011
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: RL33634
Price: $29.95

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