Michaela D. Platzer
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business
South Korea has negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States and the European Union (EU), but neither agreement has yet been approved. The U.S. Congress must approve the United States and South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) and the European Parliament must vote on the European Union and South Korea free trade agreement (KOREU FTA) before the FTAs can take effect. If the FTAs are ratified, it is possible there could be a “first mover” advantage for either the United States or the European Union, depending on which FTA is approved first. Some argue that both agreements have shortcomings and should not be approved.
This report provides U.S. lawmakers with a comparison of the manufacturing components in the KORUS and KOREU FTAs. Congressional interest in an FTA between the European Union and South Korea mostly centers on those U.S. industries competing with European industrial sectors, especially motor vehicles. The two pending FTAs raise questions about what it could mean for U.S. manufacturers if the United States takes longer, or fails altogether, to implement the KORUS FTA, while the European Union and South Korea possibly move ahead to approve and implement their outstanding FTA. In such a case, the possibility exists that the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers between the European Union and South Korean markets could result in U.S. manufacturers losing South Korean market share to European competitors. On balance, most U.S. and European manufacturing sectors, with some auto manufacturers in particular among notable dissenters, argue that the pending FTAs will be beneficial and are largely supportive. On the other side, labor unions in the United States and the European Union are considerably more skeptical, claiming that South Korean companies could be the biggest beneficiaries, since they could gain even greater access to the significantly larger U.S. and EU markets. Labor union leaders say the FTA will result in further job losses as their respective manufacturing workforces compete for market share with competitive South Korean manufacturers in their own domestic markets.
Various forces will affect how and when each side might move forward on its respective FTA. Congress has a direct role in the approval of the KORUS FTA, but until recently legislative consideration of the agreement had been at a standstill. On December 3, 2010, President Obama announced that cabinet-level negotiations and his discussions with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak produced modifications in the KORUS FTA that he believes addresses his concerns and those of Congress. Some lawmakers argue that the KORUS FTA provides a greater advantage to South Korean manufacturers than to U.S. manufacturers. Others have expressed their support for economic and national security reasons.
No specific date has been announced by the European Union on when it expects to approve its FTA with South Korea, but the European Commission (the EU’s executive charged with negotiating agreements with other countries, among its areas of responsibility) has indicated that it would like to move forward in 2011.
Automotive trade is the primary focus of this report because it is one of the most contentious and high-profile manufacturing issues in the KORUS and KOREU FTA deliberations. Additionally, brief overviews are included of other selected U.S. manufacturing sectors that could be affected by these FTAs, such as home appliances, consumer electronics, and pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Trade in agricultural products and services are not covered by this report.
Date of Report: January 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 35
Order Number: R41389
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Emily C. Barbour
Legislative Attorney
U.S. trade obligations derive from international trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the other World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, and additional bilateral and regional trade agreements, as well as domestic laws intended to implement those agreements or effectuate U.S. trade policy goals. This report provides an overview of both sources of U.S. trade obligations, focusing on a select group of agreements, provisions, and statutes that are most commonly implicated by U.S. trade interests and policy.
Historically, parties to international trade agreements were obligated to reduce two kinds of trade barriers: tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. Whereas the former may hinder an imported product’s ability to compete in a foreign market by imposing an additional cost on the product’s entry into the market, the latter has the potential to bar an import from entering that market altogether by, for example, restricting the number of such imports that can enter the market or imposing prohibitively strict packaging and labeling requirements. Consequently, at their most basic, international trade agreements obligate their parties to convert at least some of their nontariff trade barriers into tariffs, set a ceiling on the tariff rates for particular products, and then progressively reduce those rates over time. In addition, international trade agreements have increasingly broadened their scope to target domestic policies that appear to operate as unfair trade practices and to establish elaborate trade dispute settlement mechanisms. As illustrated in this report, the typical international trade agreement today disciplines its parties’ use of tariffs and trade barriers, authorizes its parties to use discriminatory trade measures to remedy certain unfair trade practices, and establishes a dispute settlement body.
Domestic trade laws, meanwhile, can broadly be classified as laws (1) authorizing trade remedies, including remedies for violations of trade agreements, countervailing duties for subsidized imports, and antidumping duties for imports sold at less than their normal value, (2) setting domestic tariff rates and providing special duty-free or preferential tariff treatment for certain products, and (3) authorizing the imposition of trade sanctions to protect U.S. security or achieve other policy goals. In addition to describing these domestic laws, this report summarizes the constitutional authorities of Congress and the executive branch over international trade. Finally, the report identifies many of the federal agencies and entities charged with overseeing the development of new trade agreements and the administration and enforcement of federal trade laws. Among the federal agencies and entities discussed are the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the International Trade Administration (ITA), the International Trade Commission (ITC), the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the United States Court of International Trade (CIT).
This report is not intended as a comprehensive review of trade law. It is an introductory overview of the legal framework governing trade-related measures. The agreements and laws selected for discussion are those most commonly implicated by U.S. trade interests, but there are U.S. trade obligations beyond those reviewed in this report.
Date of Report: January 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 71
Order Number: R41306
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M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), was signed by the United States and Colombia on November 22, 2006. The agreement must be approved by Congress before it can enter into force. Upon congressional approval, it would immediately eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation, and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years of implementation. The agreement also contains other provisions in services, investment, intellectual property rights protection, labor, and the environment. About 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free under trade preference programs or through normal trade relations, while U.S. exports to Colombia face duties of up to 20%.
It is possible that the 112th may consider implementing legislation for the proposed CFTA. Negotiations for the agreement were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allowed the President to enter into trade agreements that would receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). Implementing legislation for the CFTA (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) was introduced in the 110th Congress on April 8, 2008, under TPA. The House leadership, however, took the position that the President had submitted the implementing legislation without adequately fulfilling the TPA requirement for consultation with Congress. On April 10, 2008, the House voted 224-195 to make the provisions establishing expedited procedures, inapplicable to the CFTA implementing legislation (H.Res. 1092).
In his January 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama mentioned the importance of opening foreign markets for U.S. goods and services, and strengthening U.S. trade relations with Colombia. In 2010, the Administration initiated a new National Export Initiative (NEI), which includes a component that calls for opening new markets for U.S. exports by resolving outstanding issues on the pending CFTA. The Obama Administration also has made a case for pursuing free trade agreements as part of the National Security Strategy of the United States, though the CFTA is not specifically mentioned in the report.
The congressional debate surrounding the agreement has mostly centered on the violence issues in Colombia. Some Members of Congress oppose the agreement because of concerns about violence against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. However, numerous Members of Congress support the CFTA and take issue with these charges, stating that Colombia has made progress in recent years to curb the violence in the country. They also contend that the agreement would open the Colombian market for U.S. exporters. Other policymakers argue that Colombia is a crucial ally of the United States in Latin America and that if the trade agreement is not passed, it may lead to further violence in the region. For Colombia, a free trade agreement with the United States is part of its overall economic development strategy.
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a very small percentage of U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009), ranking 22nd among U.S. export markets and 27th as a source of U.S. imports. Economic studies on the impact of a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (FTA) have found that, upon full implementation of an agreement, the impact on the United States would be positive but very small due to the small size of the Colombian economy when compared to that of the United States (about 1.6%).
Date of Report: January 26, 2011
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: RL34470
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James K. Jackson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign capital inflows are playing an important role in the U.S. economy by bridging the gap between domestic supplies of and demand for capital. In 2008, as the financial crisis and global economic downturn unfolded, foreign investors looked to U.S. Treasury securities as a “safe haven” investment, while they sharply reduced their net purchases of corporate stocks and bonds. In 2009, foreign capital inflows continued to drop as private investors sharply retrenched, while official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign governments rose sharply. Foreign investors now hold more than 50% of the publicly held and traded U.S. Treasury securities. The large foreign accumulation of U.S. securities has spurred some observers to argue that this large foreign presence in U.S. financial markets increases the risk of a financial crisis, whether as a result of the uncoordinated actions of market participants or by a coordinated withdrawal from U.S. financial markets by foreign investors for economic or political reasons.
Congress likely would find itself embroiled in any such financial crisis through its direct role in conducting fiscal policy and in its indirect role in the conduct of monetary policy through its supervisory responsibility over the Federal Reserve. Such a coordinated withdrawal seems highly unlikely, particularly since the vast majority of the investors are private entities that presumably would find it difficult to coordinate a withdrawal. The financial crisis and economic downturn, however, reduced the value of the assets foreign investors acquired, which may make them more hesitant in the future to invest in certain types of securities. As a result of the financial crisis, foreign investors curtailed their purchases of corporate securities, a phenomenon that was not unique to the United States. In a sense, the slowdown in the U.S. economy and the rise in the personal rate of saving eased somewhat the need for foreign investment. The importance of capital inflows, may well change as the federal government’s budget deficits rise over the course of the economic downturn. This report analyzes the extent of foreign portfolio investment in the U.S. economy and assesses the economic conditions that are attracting such investment and the impact such investments are having on the economy.
Over the course of the recent recession, foreign investors have often favored dollar-denominated investments due to a number of factors, including the evaluation that such investments are a “safe haven” investment during times of uncertainty; comparatively favorable returns on investments, a surplus of saving in other areas of the world, the well-developed U.S. financial system, and the overall stability and relative rate of growth of the U.S. economy. Capital inflows also allow the United States to finance its trade deficit because foreigners are willing to lend to the United States in the form of exchanging the sale of goods, represented by U.S. imports, for such U.S. assets as U.S. businesses and real estate, stocks, bonds, and U.S. Treasury securities. Despite improvements in capital mobility, foreign capital inflows do not fully replace or compensate for a lack of domestic sources of capital. Economic analysis shows that a nation’s rate of capital formation, or domestic investment, seems to have been linked primarily to its domestic rate of saving.
This report relies on a comprehensive set of data on capital flows, represented by purchases and sales of U.S. government securities and U.S. and foreign corporate stocks, bonds, into and out of the United States, that is reported by the Treasury Department on a monthly basis.
Date of Report: January 26, 2011
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: RL32462
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Jonathan E. Sanford
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Congress has been concerned, for many years, with the possible impact that currency manipulation has on international trade. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has jurisdiction for exchange rate questions. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is responsible for the rules governing international trade. The two organizations approach the issue of “currency manipulation” differently. The IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit countries from manipulating their currency for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage, but the IMF cannot force a country to change its exchange rate policies. The WTO has rules against subsidies, but these are very narrow and specific and do not seem to encompass currency manipulation. Recently, some have argued that an earlier ruling by a WTO dispute resolution panel might be a way that currency issues could be included in the WTO prohibition against export subsidies. Congress is currently considering legislation to amend U.S. countervailing duty law, based on this precedent, that the proponents believe is consistent with WTO rules. Others disagree as to whether the previous case is a sufficient precedent.
Several options might be considered for addressing this matter in the future, if policymakers deem this a wise course of action. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF or the WTO Agreements could be amended in order to make their treatment of currency manipulation more consistent. Negotiations might be pursued, on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis, to resolve currency manipulation disputes on a country-by-country basis without changing the IMF or WTO treatment of this concern. Some countries might argue that the actions of another violate WTO rules and seek a favorable decision by a WTO dispute resolution panel. Finally, the IMF and WTO could use their interagency agreement to promote better coordination in their treatment of this concern.
Date of Report: January 28, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS22658
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