Search Penny Hill Press

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues


J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Trade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary U.S.-Latin America relations. Latin America is far from the largest U.S. regional trade partner, but historically is the fastest growing one. Between 1998 and 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade (exports plus imports) with Latin America grew by 82% compared to 72% for Asia (driven largely by China), 51% for the European Union, 221% for Africa, and 64% for the world. Mexico composed 11.7% of total U.S. merchandise trade in 2009 and is the largest Latin American trade partner. It accounted for 58% of the region’s trade with the United States, the result of a long history of economic integration between the two countries. By contrast, the rest of Latin America together makes up only 8.3% of U.S. trade, half of which is trade with Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Latin American countries have made noted progress in trade liberalization, reducing tariffs significantly and entering into their own regional agreements. This development presented an opportunity for the United States, which has supported deeper regional integration because it has been widely viewed as beneficial for both economic and foreign policy reasons. The United States has implemented comprehensive bilateral or plurilateral reciprocal trade agreements with most of its important trade partners in Latin America. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and bilateral FTAs with Chile and Peru. FTAs with Panama and Colombia have been signed but not implemented, pending congressional action.

Some of the largest economies in South America, however, are not part of U.S. FTAs and have resisted a region-wide agreement, the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA), in part because it represented an extension of the same trade model used by the United States in bilateral agreements. Many countries south of the Caribbean Basin have been reluctant to enter into such a deal because it does not meet their primary negotiation objectives. Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela are less compelled to capitulate to U.S. demands because they are far less dependent on the U.S. economy than countries in the Caribbean Basin, do not rely on U.S. regional unilateral preferential arrangements (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative or Andean Trade Preference Act), and would have to redefine their subregional trade pacts.

The result in the Western Hemisphere has been an expansive system of disparate bilateral and plurilateral agreements, which are widely understood to be a second best solution for reaping the benefits of trade liberalization. Alternatives to a new round of currently unpopular FTAs are being debated. It has been suggested, for example, that FTAs be revised, enhancing controversial environment, labor, and other chapters. The response in Latin, however, has been tepid. Another option is to move incrementally toward harmonization or convergence of the many trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere by adopting administrative solutions where possible. One example is to expand rules of origin and cumulation provisions.

With respect to FTA implementation, another critical issue is the provision of trade capacity building and other technical assistance to address supply-side constraints in areas such as port and customs operations modernization, infrastructure investment, technology enhancement, and development of common standards in general. These are often major constraints to the more fluid movement of goods in Latin American countries. It is uncertain what the next step in Western Hemisphere economic integration may be, and these alternatives may be difficult to implement and monitor. But at the margin, they could provide benefits in light of the apparent hiatus in moving ahead with either a multilateral or hemispheric trade accord.



Date of Report: February 8, 2011
Number of Pages: 13
Order Number: 98-840
Price: $29.95

Follow us on TWITTER at
http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press  or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues


Shayerah Ilias
Analyst in International Trade and Finance

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), an independent federal government agency, is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. It helps finance American exports of manufactured goods and services, with the objective of contributing to the employment of U.S. workers, primarily in circumstances when alternative financing is not available. Ex-Im Bank also may assist U.S. exporters to meet foreign, officially sponsored, export credit competition. Ex-Im Bank’s main programs are direct loans, loan guarantees, working capital guarantees, and export credit insurance. Ex-Im Bank transactions are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. The Bank operates under a renewable charter, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, and has been reauthorized through September 30, 2011 (P.L. 109- 438). The Charter requires that all of the Bank’s financing have a reasonable assurance of repayment and directs the Bank to supplement, and to not compete with, private capital.

The 112
th Congress may introduce legislation to renew Ex-Im Bank’s authority. In considering such legislation, Members of Congress may examine issues related to Ex-Im Bank that center on the economic rationale for the Bank; the impact of the Bank on the federal budget and U.S. taxpayers; the Bank’s support for specific types of business or industries; the current balance between the Bank’s advancement of U.S. commercial interests and other U.S. policy goals; the competitive position of Bank compared to foreign ECAs; and the Bank’s role in federal export promotion efforts.

Ex-Im Bank finances less than 5% of U.S. exports a year. In light of the international financial crisis, demand for Ex-Im Bank services has grown in recent years. In FY2010, the Bank approved more than 3,500 transactions of credit and insurance support, totaling about $24 billion—the highest level of authorizations in the history of the Bank.

Ex-Im Bank has been “self-sustaining” for appropriations purposes since FY2008. It uses offsetting collections to cover its operations. Congress sets an upper limit on the level of the Bank's financial activities as part of the annual appropriations process. For FY2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-17) authorized a limit of $58 million on the total amount that Ex-Im Bank can spend on its credit and insurance programs and a limit of $83.88 million for the Bank’s administrative expenses. For FY2011, the President requested a limit of $92.7 million on the total amount the Bank can spend on its credit and insurance programs and a limit of $105.6 million for the Bank’s administrative expenses. Congress has not enacted appropriations for FY2011 government funding measures, but passed a series of continuing resolutions to fund most government programs, including Ex-Im Bank, at the FY2010- enacted level. P.L. 111-322 extends funding at this level to March 4, 2011.

Ex-Im Bank is one of approximately 20 federal government agencies involved in promoting U.S. exports and is a participant in President Obama’s National Export Initiative (NEI), a plan to double exports by 2015 to support two million U.S. jobs.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “Arrangement on Export Credits” sets forth export credit terms and conditions, including restrictions on tied aid, for the activities of Ex-Im Bank and the ECAs of foreign countries that are OECD members. Other OECD agreements set forth sector-specific rules, guidelines on environmental procedures, and other terms and conditions.



Date of Report: February 9, 2011
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: 98-568
Price: $29.95

Follow us on TWITTER at
http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press  or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues

M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) extends duty-free treatment to certain U.S. imports that meet domestic content and other requirements from designated countries in the Andean region. The purpose of ATPA is to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. ATPA (Title II of P.L. 102-182) was enacted on December 4, 1991. It was renewed and modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002, extending trade preferences until December 31, 2006. Since that time, Congress has provided several short-term extensions of ATPA. The most recent extension took place late in December 2010 when the 111th Congress enacted legislation for a six-week extension of ATPA for Colombia and Ecuador until February 12, 2011 (H.R. 6517).

The countries originally designated to qualify for trade preferences under ATPA were Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Trade preferences for Peru were not renewed in 2010 because Peru has a free trade agreement with the United States, which entered into force in February 2009. In the case of Bolivia, trade preferences were suspended in December 2008 because Bolivia failed to meet ATPA eligibility criteria related to counter-narcotics cooperation. Bolivia may only be reinstated as a beneficiary country under ATPA if Congress approves legislation to do so.

The impact of the ATPA on coca production in Andean countries has been small and mostly indirect, according to a 2010 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission. The study reports that illegal coca cultivation fell substantially in Andean countries from a 20-year peak of 232,500 hectares in 2007 to 192,000 in 2008. The study also reports that the ATPA, in combination with other alternative development programs, may indirectly have helped support job growth in certain exports from Andean countries, such as fresh-cut flowers, asparagus, bananas, and pineapples.

The trade effects of ATPA on the U.S. economy have been minimal because the amount of U.S. trade with the Andean region is low. The value of duty-free U.S. imports under ATPA accounts for about 0.7% of total U.S. imports, or 0.1% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Nearly 90% of U.S. imports from ATPA countries enter duty-free under various trade preference programs or through normal trade relations. Duty-free imports under ATPA account for 45.8% of total U.S. imports from ATPA countries. Leading U.S. ATPA imports in 2009 were crude petroleum oil, cut flowers, petroleum-oil products (other than crude), refined copper, and knitted or crocheted apparel.

The 112
th Congress may reevaluate the extension of ATPA trade preferences for Ecuador and Colombia, and could decide to reconsider the suspension of preferences for Bolivia. Policymakers may also consider broader reform of U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences. Some Members of Congress maintain that if ATPA trade preferences are not extended, the United States and the Andean countries risk losing some of the economic progress that has been achieved over the eighteen-year life of the program. Supporters of ATPA argue that the program should continue to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the “alternative development” counternarcotics strategy. Critics of ATPA argue that unilateral trade programs are ineffective; that the ATPA has forced U.S. producers to compete with lower-cost Andean imports; and, in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, that trade preferences should not be extended to countries that do not support U.S. foreign and trade policies.


Date of Report: January 21, 2011
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS22548
Price: $29.95

Follow us on TWITTER at
http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press  or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Monday, February 14, 2011

The United States as a Net Debtor Nation: Overview of the International Investment Position


James K. Jackson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

The international investment position of the United States is an annual measure of the assets Americans own abroad and the assets foreigners own in the United States. The net position, or the difference between the two, sometimes is referred to as a measure of U.S. international indebtedness. This designation is not strictly correct, because the net international investment position reveals the difference between the total assets Americans own abroad and the total amount of assets foreigners own in the United States. These assets generate flows of capital into and out of the economy that have important implications for the value of the dollar in international exchange markets. Some Members of Congress and some in the public have expressed concerns about the U.S. net international investment position because of the role foreign investors are playing in U.S. capital markets and the potential for large outflows of income and services payments. Some observers also argue that the U.S. reliance on foreign capital inflows places the economy in a vulnerable position.


Date of Report: February 1, 2011
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: RL32964
Price: $29.95

Follow us on TWITTER at
http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press  or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Friday, February 11, 2011

Trade Agreements: Impact on the U.S. Economy

James K. Jackson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

The United States is in the process of considering a number of trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP). The Congress also may address the issue of trade promotion authority (TPA), which expired on July 1, 2007. The various trade agreements range from bilateral trade agreements with countries that account for meager shares of U.S. trade to multilateral negotiations that could affect large numbers of U.S. workers and businesses. During this process, Congress likely will be presented with an array of data estimating the impact of trade agreements on the economy, or on a particular segment of the economy.

An important policy tool that can assist Congress in assessing the value and the impact of trade agreements is represented by sophisticated models of the economy that are capable of simulating changes in economic conditions. These models are particularly helpful in estimating the effects of trade liberalization in such sectors as agriculture and manufacturing where the barriers to trade are identifiable and subject to some quantifiable estimation. Barriers to trade in services, however, are proving to be more difficult to identify and, therefore, to quantify in an economic model. All of the models incorporate various assumptions that are necessary in order for the models to generate results. Invariably, these assumptions determine to some extent the results that are generated and limit their usefulness. In addition, the models are highly sensitive to the assumptions that are used to establish the parameters of the model and they are hampered by a serious lack of comprehensive data in the services sector. Nevertheless, the models provide some insight into the magnitude of the economic effects that may occur across economic sectors as a result of trade liberalization. These insights are especially helpful in identifying sectors expected to experience the greatest adjustment costs and, therefore, where opposition to trade agreements is likely to occur.

This report examines the major features of economic models being used to estimate the effects of trade agreements. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the models as an aid in helping Congress evaluate the economic impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy. In addition, this report identifies and assesses some of the assumptions used in the economic models and how these assumptions affect the data generated by the models. Finally, this report evaluates the implications for Congress of various options it may consider as it assesses trade agreements.



Date of Report:
February 1, 2011
Number of Pages: 26
Order Number: RL31932
Price: $29.95

Follow us on TWITTER at
http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports

Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail
Penny Hill Press  or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.